What You Exported Matters: Persistence in Productive Capabilities across Two Eras of Globalization by Weber, Isabella M et al.
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics 
2021 
What You Exported Matters: Persistence in Productive 
Capabilities across Two Eras of Globalization 




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
 1 
What You Exported Matters: Persistence in 
Productive Capabilities across Two Eras of 
Globalization 
 
Isabella M. Weber,1 Gregor Semieniuk,2 Tom Westland,3 Junshang Liang4 
 
27 January 2021 
 
Abstract 
Does what you exported matter? We build a new global commodity-level export database for the 
previous era of globalization and find persistence in productive capabilities proxied by economic 
complexity, export diversification, and sophistication across a century. We also show that 
productive capabilities at the turn of the 20th century are a powerful predictor of today’s income 
levels. We demonstrate that our results are not driven by persistence in geography or institutions. 
The persistence mechanism is the complementarity between past and future productive 
capabilities with one important qualification, the persistent negative effect of European overseas 
colonization. We also study shocks that undermined persistence, confirm the resource curse 
hypothesis for the long run and find a positive but slow effect of democratization. 




Why are some nations rich and others poor? This is one of the cardinal questions in economics. 
In recent years, a growing number of persistence studies locates the answer in the distant past 
(Voth, 2021). Most focus on non-economic factors as drivers of long-term growth such as 
culture, institutions, geography and genetics. In this paper, we analyze persistence in a key 
economic aspect: countries’ productive capabilities. Complexity economics demonstrates that 
export data can reveal countries’ productive capabilities (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009) and that 
what you export matters for how fast you grow (Hausmann, Hwang, & Rodrik, 2007; S. Lall, 
2000). We construct a new global export database on the commodity level for the previous era of 
globalization. We show that countries’ productive capability rankings are persistent across the 
two eras of globalization (1897-1906 to 1998-2007) and that productive capabilities a century 
ago can predict today’s GDP per capita.  
 
The importance of productive capabilities for economic growth is a long-standing insight 
(Dahlman, Ross-Larson, & Westphal, 1987; Fagerberg & Srholec, 2008). Recently Weitzman 
(1998), Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011) and van Dam & Frenken (2020) have argued that initial 
productive capabilities matter: The more capabilities a country has, the more it can develop. If 
new products require a recombination of certain tasks, then having the capability to carry out 
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these tasks improve the likelihood to develop the new product. The capabilities to produce 
batteries and internal combustion engine cars certainly help with developing electric vehicles. 
This combinatorial feature makes productive capabilities a natural candidate for persistence.  
 
Export competitiveness can proxy capabilities. Export diversification reveals insights about the 
variety of capabilities while complexity and sophistication of exports add information on their 
quality (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009; Lectard & Rougier, 2018). Until now, the long-run 
persistence of productive capabilities could not be analyzed due to a lack of historical data. We 
employ colonial statistics to create a new database that enables us to measure export 
diversification, complexity and sophistication in a consistent fashion across a century.  
 
We use the previous globalization as reference period since this was both the first time that the 
whole world was integrated into international trade which is necessary to use exports as 
meaningful proxy. It also coincided with the high point of colonial statistics which enables us to 
achieve almost global coverage and to disaggregate our data to the level of specific commodities. 
To the best of our knowledge ours is the first database that goes beyond Lamartine Yates’s 
(1959) ‘census’ of world trade for the year 1913 that records broad commodity types.5 To make 
our historical data compatible with UN COMTRADE we translate commodity classifications in 
primary sources into the Standard International Trade Classification. As a result, we can measure 
the same variables for both the historical reference period (1897-1906) and the contemporary one 
(1998-2007) – unlike most other persistence studies (Bisin & Moro, 2021).  
 
Figures 1a and 1b map countries’ export diversification by decile in 1897-1906 to 1998-2007 
measured as the number of different commodities exported by a country.6 This illustrates our 
data coverage and the trend of persistence. Europe and the United States occupy the top rank 
then and now while Asian countries are largely in the upper medium ranks in both periods. Some 
notable cases of falling behind are Russia and the Middle East as well as several African 
countries, while Brazil and Argentine are hopeful cases of catching up. 
 
Our regression analysis shows that all our proxies of productive capabilities (diversification, 
complexity and sophistication) for the previous era of globalization are highly statistically 
significant and quantitatively important predictors of their respective contemporary values. Put 
simply, what you exported matters: Countries that lacked productive capabilities then, tend to be 
trapped and catching up is the exception rather than the rule. This is robust to varying the 
revealed comparative advantage threshold and SITC digit level as well as to adding standard 
control variables in the trade diversification and growth literature including resource rent, 
population, human capital, trade openness, FDI and polity. Based on all three proxies, 
persistence across the two waves of globalization is quantitatively vastly more important than the 
whole range of controls combined. This finding is confirmed by principal component analysis for 
which we add the manufacturing share as a more traditional measure of industrial development. 
We also find persistence in relation to the intermediate periods 1962-1971 and 1979-1988 and 
can therefore rule out re-emergence. 
 
5 For want of more comprehensive data, Yates’s (1959) work is still used in exercises that decompose trade in the 
previous era of globalization to the sectoral level (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007; Galor, 2005; O’Rourke, 2018). 
6 Revealed comparative advantage by country x in commodity y is defined as the share of x in the value of y’s 
exports divided by the share of x in the value of global exports (Balassa, 1965).  
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A robust stylized fact in development economics is that the ways in which countries are 
integrated into global trade matters for their prosperity.7 We test this relation for the first time for 
the long run of a century and find the more diversified, complex and sophisticated a country’s 
exports at the turn of the 20th century, the higher the wealth of the nation today. 56 per cent of 
the variance in today’s per capita GDP can be explained by countries’ economic complexity in 
1897-1906 (see Table 6 Column 3). All our measures of productive capabilities in the previous 
era of globalization are highly significant at the 1 per cent significance level in relation to per 
capita GDP in the present period. This finding is robust to the aforementioned variations in data 
configuration and controls.   
 
We adopt Comin, Easterly and Gong’s (2010) model for persistence in technology to devise a 
simple framework to analyze drivers of persistence in productive capabilities. We test two 
alternative persistence mechanisms: complementarities between past and future capabilities or a 
persistent third variable, such as geography or institutions. A large and influential literature 
places geography center stage to explain growth, development and trade (Frankel & Romer, 
1999; Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1998; Sachs, 2001, 2003). Similarly, institutions have been 
foregrounded as primary drivers of a country’s economic performance (Acemoglu, Egorov, & 
Sonin, 2021; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). We show that the correlates of our proxies 
measured a century ago do not explain productive capabilities today. This is subject to an 
important exception: The productive capabilities of European overseas colonies were 
significantly lower than those of other countries across both periods. Meanwhile, 
complementarities are a good explanation, even after controlling for persistent covariates. 
 
We follow Voigtländer and Voth (2012) and examine cases of path-defiance. We analyze policy 
and institutional shocks as well as changes to natural endowments. We find that broad brush 
proxies for development policy paradigms do not alter persistence, while the path-defying effect 
of democratization appears to be slow. Countries that discovered oil showed downward path-
defiance, significantly reducing their export diversification, complexity and sophistication. This 
confirms the resource curse hypothesis for the long run (Frankel, 2010).  
 
Our results contribute to the persistence literature that examines historical sources of 
contemporary development (Nunn, 2020). A set of recent studies uncovers the importance of a 
variety of institutional, geographic and cultural factors that persist over long periods and can be 
linked to contemporary economic outcomes (Voth, 2021). A prominent finding is the importance 
of colonial heritage in the long run (Dell, 2010; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011) which is confirmed 
in our study. Unlike most of these studies, we measure economic indicators directly in the 
historical period. Moreover, we use the same measures in the historical and in the contemporary 
period (Bisin & Moro, 2021). This is thanks to our rich data on commodity-level exports. Along 
with tax data that has recently been harnessed for long-term economic analysis (Piketty & Saez, 
2003), trade statistics are some of the earliest detailed systematic records that can be aggregated 
to the national level and they are available on an almost global scale.  
 
 
7 See for example Hausmann et al. (2007); Hausmann & Hidalgo (2011); Hesse (2009); Hirschman (1958); Hidalgo, 
Winger, Barabási, & Hausmann (2007); Lederman & Maloney (2003); Prebisch (1950); Rosenstein-Rodan (1943); 
Zhu & Li (2017).  
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The wide coverage of countries across a century relates our study to the convergence literature. 
Few topics in economics are as consequential both for theory and policy as the convergence 
hypothesis, which states that “initial conditions have no implications for the long-run distribution 
of per capita income” (Johnson & Papageorgiou, 2020, 130). A recent literature review shows 
that the convergence hypothesis is not backed by empirical evidence, yet the mechanisms 
preventing convergence are poorly understood (ibid.). The data on GDP per capita over time is 
not universally robust, even in the post-war period (Jerven, 2013). This creates a need to consider 
other metrics of convergence and divergence across a longer time span. Our paper suggests that 
initial conditions in productive capabilities matter in the long-run and affect GDP outcomes even 
today.  
 
Our study also speaks to development economics seeking to unlock conditions for successful 
growth. A large body of literature investigates how export diversification can serve growth 
(Lederman & Maloney, 2012). Our paper highlights the importance of long-term persistence in 
export patterns which points to important constraints. We find that many of the usual policy 
variables (e.g. trade openness, FDI, human capital, institutions) did not diminish the importance 
of past productive capabilities in explaining today’s development outcomes. Path-defiant cases 
therefore merit further study to identify policy strategies that succeeded in undermining 
persistence. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides historical background on the previous 
globalization and introduces our data and measures of productive capabilities. In section III, we 
describe our empirical strategy and present our main results. Section IV analyzes the persistence 
mechanism and cases of path-defiance. Section V concludes.  
 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT, DATA AND MEASURES 
 
Our data covers a decade of merchandise exports for the previous and current waves of 
globalization (1897-1906 and 1998-2007). We construct a new global commodity-level database. 
We exploit colonial trade data, among the richest of colonial records, and record commodity 
level export data for 100 countries. This is about double the number of countries for which the 
Maddison Project reports GDP in 1900 and 1913 (Bolt & van Zanden, 2020). We use three 
export-based measures devised by Hausman and Hidalgo (2009) and others (diversification, 
economic complexity and export sophistication) as proxies for productive capabilities for both 
periods. This allows us to study the persistence of countries’ position on the global development 
ladder across a century. 
 
A Two Eras of Globalization and Colonial Trade Statistics 
 
To test the long-term global persistence of productive capabilities using export data it is desirable 
to compare two periods of roughly similar degrees of global market integration. Previous studies 
on the evolution of economic complexity, diversification and underlying productive capabilities 
have been limited to the post-1962 period covered by the UN COMTRADE database (Cadot, 
Carrère, & Strauss-Kahn, 2013; Hausmann et al., 2007), which spans a phase of high levels of 
protectionism followed by a phase with increasingly free markets. For this paper we have 
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constructed a new dataset for the previous era of globalization which enables us to test 
persistence across two periods of high levels of market integration and across a considerably 
longer time span.  
 
The previous era of globalization (1870-1913) was the first time that nearly all territories and 
peoples of the world were comprehensively integrated in a global division of labor. As such this 
was a formative period for global export patterns. Long-distance trade had gained importance in 
earlier periods, but only in the late 19th century globalization fundamentally shaped the internal 
organization of economies around the world (O’Rourke & Williamson, 2002; Williamson, 2011; 
Pascali, 2017). World trade boomed from 1870 to 1913 accounting for the first time for more 
than 20 per cent of world GDP (Estevadeordal, Frantz, & Taylor, 2003).8 Measures such as 
global price convergence, savings-investment correlations and current account imbalances 
demonstrate global market integration (Jones & Obstfeld, 1997; Obstfeld & Taylor, 2004; 
Schularick, 2006; Taylor et al., 2002). The trade boom was facilitated by a transport and 
communication revolution (steamships, railways and telegraphs); backed by the gold standard 
and internationalizing financial markets; and fueled by a “growth miracle” in the capitalist core 
countries (Federico & Persson, 2007; Jacks, Meissner, & Novy, 2009; Lewis, 1969; Pascali, 
2017; Williamson, 2011).  
 
With the first World War the previous globalization started to disintegrate. The post-World War 
II period was marked by decades of protectionism, the spread of state socialism and state-led 
development. The world only began to re-globalize in the 1980s under the renewed rise of free 
markets. According to the Sachs-Warner index, the share of countries with free trade policies 
was as low as 15.6 per cent in 1960, but increased from 26 per cent in 1985 to 73 per cent in 
2000 (Wacziarg & Welch, 2003).  
 
We compare two decades of data across a century. This allows us to trace the persistence in 
productive capabilities in relation to the first period of a comprehensive and truly global division 
of labor. For our comparison across a century, our main concern in choosing our contemporary 
reference period is to capture globalization in its maturity. It is contested whether the ongoing 
wave of globalization is ebbing (O’Rourke, 2018) but the pre-2008 period is certainly part of its 
high point before a return of protectionism (Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy, & Khandelwal, 
2020). Trade openness measured in terms of the share of global merchandise trade in world GDP 
peaked in 2008 at 24.6 per cent (UNCTAD, 2020). We use the decade before the Great 
Recession (1998-2007) and after the Asian financial as a period comparable to the last era of 
globalization in terms of the relative absence of a major global crisis. For this contemporary 
period we rely on UN COMTRADE data available at the Observatory of Economic Complexity.9  
 
We construct our database for the decade 1897-1906 for which we achieve close to global 
coverage (see Table 1 and Figure 1a). Peak openness in the last era of globalization varies across 
countries with the United States and Canada peaking as early as 1900 and Japan as late as 1929 
(Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1996, 6). The end of the last era of globalization is usually dated as 
 
8 Estimates of the rate of growth of GDP and of trade in the period 1870-1913 vary but trade certainly outpaced 
output (Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1998, 5). Mitchie & Kitson (1995) suggest that output growth was 2.7 per cent 
and trade growth 3.5 per cent; Maddison (1989) estimates 2.5 per cent and 3.9 per cent respectively.  
9 The data is available here: https://legacy.oec.world/en/resources/data/.  
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1913. 1897-1906 is sufficiently close to this end point to capture mature globalization and marks 
a decade without major global crises.10  
 
By the turn of the 20th century the global division of labor brought about by the Great 
Divergence (Pomeranz, 2000) was firmly established. At the onset of the industrial revolution in 
1750, the share in world manufacturing output of Asia, Africa and Latin America combined 
accounted for 73 per cent and in 1860 still for 36.6 per cent. By 1913 this share had fallen to 7.5 
per cent and that of Europe, North America and Japan conversely increased to 92.5 per cent 
(Bairoch, 1982; Galor, 2011; Nayyar, 2013a). As a result of this increasing asymmetry, living 
standards diverged drastically in the 19th century with the new industrial core pulling ahead 
(Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007, 414; O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999; Pritchett, 1997; Williamson, 
2011, 6). This paper explores whether the asymmetry in global productive capabilities brought 
about by the Great Divergence persists until the present era of globalization. 
 
In constructing our database, we exploit the fact that the turn of the twentieth century represents 
the high point in terms of colonial trade statistics. This was the Age of High Imperialism and the 
peak of colonial administrative capacity (Ferguson, 2002; Mitchener & Weidenmier, 2008). By 
then Europe’s imperial powers had opened up the rest of the world through direct colonization as 
in the case of most of Africa or through gunboat diplomacy towards the nominally independent 
countries as in several Asian countries (Bairoch & Kozul-Wright, 1998; Findlay & O’Rourke, 
2007b; Nayyar, 2006, 2013a; Williamson, 2002). When globalization came to a close in 1914, 
Europe controlled 84 per cent of the world’s surface which had increased from 67 per cent in 
1878 (Headrick, 1981, 3).  
 
Export data are some of the richest, and most accurate, of the colonial statistics. Trade data are 
more reliable than most colonial statistics. Censuses were only rarely undertaken, and were often 
little more than guesstimates, especially in African colonies (Frankema & Jerven, 2014). 
Detailed data on the overall structures of colonial economies was rarely collected in any 
systematic fashion in this period. In contrast, colonial governments relied on trade taxes for 
revenue and therefore kept careful records of the international flow of goods (Gardner, 2013). 
This was the case both for colonies and the colonial home countries of Europe which at the time 
experienced a protectionist backlash that ended the preceding period of openness. The self-
governing white settler colonies and some Latin American countries also raised tariffs and to this 
end kept careful trade statistics (Bairoch & Burke, 1989; Findlay & O’Rourke, 2003, 2007; 
O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999, 93-118; Williamson, 2006, 2011). The United Kingdom stands 
as major exception of continued economic openness at home but nonetheless collected detailed 
statistics on its own trade, and, as the ruler of the most expansive colonial empire, ensured that 
statistical processes were implanted in the territories it ruled (Touchelay, 2019). After the First 
World War, French data becomes much less available in compiled form, and though the British 
statistical compendia were still published, export statistics begin to become generally less 
detailed at the commodity level. 
 
10 Of course, no single decade will be perfectly free from political or economic change: our period includes, for 
example, the Russo-Japanese War, the Constitutional Revolution in Persia, and the colonization of several parts of 
the African continent by European powers. However, for the most part major economic crises were absent: the Long 
Depression in Europe and the United States had ended by the middle of the 1890s, as had the aftershocks of the 
Barings Crisis of 1890 and the Encilhamento in Brazil. 
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We collect our data from various sources in five languages. Exports from British colonies were 
taken from the annual Blue Books, annual Colonial Reports, and the Statistical Abstract of the 
British Empire. These were all official statistical documents, with data on exports compiled from 
colony-level customs records. Data for French colonies were compiled from the annual 
Statistiques Coloniales: Commerce, a comprehensive statistical compendium drawn up by the 
Ministry of Colonies in Paris from colony-level customs records. The Statistiques Coloniales 
were compiled rigorously prior to the First World War, but cease thereafter, replaced by a 
piecemeal set of colony-specific documents. Trade figures for the German overseas empire were 
published annually in the official Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich. For some 
countries where systematic official data is lacking, we used contemporaneous non-government 
sources in Portuguese and Spanish, and drew on several country-specific sources. 
 
Data on other countries were mainly gathered from diplomatic reports on trade, principally those 
drawn up by British consular officials in the countries in question; though potentially less 
reliable than official country-level statistics, the consular reports are available for countries 
which did not publish statistical publications of their own; British consuls often obtained figures 
directly from customs offices. Data for most European countries, and a portion of independent 
countries and colonies, were taken from the US compilation Statistical Abstract of Foreign 
Countries (1909). This was a document drawn up by the US Department of Commerce in order 
to provide comprehensive statistical information on world trade for the benefit of American 
businesses. 
 
B Data Overview 
 
We have constructed a new database of global merchandise exports that allows us to create a 
unique snapshot of the economic development around the world at the turn to the 20th century. 
Digitizing comprehensive primary sources on trade flows, we have recorded export data for up to 
100 countries on the commodity-level. This compares with only 45 and 69 countries for which 
the Maddison Project reports GDP in 1900 and 1913 respectively, and of which only one country 
is in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bolt & van Zanden, 2020).  
 
To our knowledge this is the first such global database recording commodity-level exports and 
the first effort to go beyond Lamartine Yates’s (1959) ‘census’ of global trade for the year 1913. 
Yates hand-coded exports from primary sources. However, he did not publish the underlying 
data, and his sources are not rigorously documented. Furthermore, his coding was—while 
extremely detailed for historical work in the 1950s—not highly disaggregated when compared to 
our dataset: he listed 57 separate commodities, while we document nearly ten times as many, 
with 545 unique SITC codes recorded in our historical dataset. Other recent datasets only record 
aggregate trade flows (Federico & Tena-Junguito, 2019) or are limited to regional or country-
level coverage (Frankema, Williamson, & Woltjer, 2018; Meissner & Tang, 2018).  
 
Our dataset provides near-global coverage for ten years 1897-1906 of commodity level exports. 
In order to stay true to our aim to compile detailed commodity-level data, some countries had to 
be excluded that could enter the aggregate datasets, like Afghanistan or Mongolia. Due to 
difficulties in collecting data on trade that did not flow via ports, trade data tends to be sparse in 
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our period for landlocked developing countries, such as those in central Asia or central Africa (in 
the latter case, statistics would become more detailed as colonial rule was entrenched). In one 
case, that of Nepal, we could reconstruct the commodity composition of exports by relying on 
Indian trade statistics, since this was overwhelmingly where Nepalese exports were directed. 
Nevertheless, the resulting dataset is close to other estimates of global total exports, as Table 1 
shows. For the decade 1897-1906 we cover no less than 80% of global trade as measured by 
Federico and Tena-Junguito (2019) in every year except 1897, and 84% on average.  
 
Our country-level aggregates might be more accurate than those recorded in aggregate trade 
databases. Recording commodity level data, we avoid certain problems that beset aggregate 
datasets from that period: for example, our dataset explicitly excludes monetary bullion. This is 
in contrast to other datasets in which bullion-inclusive aggregate export figures have been taken 
from primary sources with either little or incomplete correction, (this is often the case, for 
example, in the trade aggregates presented in Mitchell’s Historical Statistics compilations). 
Because we worked from the commodity level, we could explicitly exclude such flows. 
 
We constructed our dataset as follows. Historical records of trade statistics were scanned and 
converted to digital format using optimal character recognition technology. The original source 
documents were compared with the digitized versions and mistakes corrected manually by at 
least two checkers. The quality of our data has been ensured by performing a number of 
robustness checks. This has included checking for unusually large changes in exports between 
years and benchmarking total exports against existing datasets for aggregate trade data. All 
export flows in local currencies were converted to US dollars at prevailing exchange rates, using 
the Federico and Tena-Junguito (2019) market exchange rate dataset.  
 
We compiled the data on the basis of special exports: that is, all domestic exports of goods 
produced wholly or partly within each country, excluding transit trade, re-exports, and purely 
monetary flows of bullion and specie. We therefore get as close as possible to a dataset listing 
only exports that were produced within the country that exported them. Most original source 
material list transit trade, re-exports and bullion and specie separately at the commodity level. In 
two major cases—the Netherlands and Belgium—so-called ‘disguised transit’ is a well-known 
problem whereby transit trade was incorrectly listed as special trade. We relied on existing 
studies of those countries’ exports to correct for this problem (Horlings, 2002; van Zanden & 
Lindblad, 1989). Additionally, we use international prices (Federico & Tena-Junguito, 2019) to 
correct for inaccurate ‘administrative’ pricing in several countries, especially the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Spain.  
 
Country borders are not fixed over time. The goal of this project is to help explain patterns of 
structural change and diversification over time, and to this end, we wished as far as possible to 
record exports from geographical units that most closely approximate current nation states. To 
this end, we have used subnational sources for some countries or colonies where these were 
available to help. For example, in reconstructing the trade of countries in the former Ottoman 
Empire, we drew on port-level records from British and French consuls to estimate exports from 
areas that are today independent countries, like Turkey, Lebanon and Israel. Similarly, we 
deducted all exports at the commodity level from British Burma, for which independent statistics 
exist, from the aggregate figures for British India. Inevitably, this procedure was not always 
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possible, and we have sometimes been forced to assign all exports from a larger geographical 
unit, like French Indochina, to its most economically important component country (in this case 
Vietnam). 
 
In total, the dataset reports detailed exports of up to 545 separate commodities per country-year 
between 1987-1906, for 100 polities. This represents 2194 unique product descriptions in our 
primary sources in their original languages. For example, unprocessed rubber, ‘raw rubber’, 
‘caoutchouc’ and ‘Rohkautschuk’ are 4 different descriptions but all translate to the same SITC 
code because they represent the same commodity. We have manually translated the historical 
commodity classifications into the contemporary SITC (rev.4) system at the four-digit level. 
Each product description was investigated and matched to the closest product description in the 
full SITC nomenclature by a coder. In case of doubt, the full team of three coders considered the 
description and assigned the most appropriate SITC code. A dictionary to translate from original 
product descriptions to SITC codes was thus created. After assembling the dictionary, we then 
performed several manual checks, looking at items that had been assigned the same SITC code to 
ensure all of the product descriptions were appropriate. This translation exercise ensures that our 
data is directly comparable with contemporary trade statistics such as UN COMTRADE, which 
are also recorded and presented using the SITC nomenclature.  
 
Throughout the paper we use data at the SITC-3 level. SITC-3 is also used as disaggregation 
level for diversification analysis in other recent studies (e.g. Lall, Weiss, & Zhang, 2005; Zhu & 
Fu, 2013) as well as in Michaely's (1984) pioneering work. Our data is most complete and 
reliable at the 3-digit level for two reasons. First, the product descriptions in the primary sources 
were in some cases too vague to attribute the more specific four-digit category. Second, the SITC 
classification system is set up to record some kinds of detail and not others: for example, in 
classifying wood and timber, the SITC system pays close attention to the treatment and 
transformation of wood, without caring much about the kind of wood (i.e., from what kind of 
trees). In primary sources from the early twentieth century, by contrast, we often have reasonably 
good information about the kind of wood but only at times about its treatment. So, going down to 
the SITC-4 level would introduce a bias where it would seem that a country is exporting more 
distinct commodities simply because its trade statistics include the treatment of wood instead of 
its kind. For the more general 3-digit classification this problem is not generally an issue in our 
data. 
 
C Measures of Productive Capabilities 
 
Exports can reveal the productive capabilities required to gain competitiveness in certain sectors 
(Sutton & Trefler, 2016). On the most basic level productive capabilities include technology and 
inputs. For example, a country without furnaces or iron will not be able to export steel. But 
productive capabilities required to gain competitiveness also involve more intangible inputs such 
as knowledge, management techniques, a disciplined labor force, a conducive institutional 
environment, access to finance and much more (Lall, 1992). For export data to capture these 
underlying conditions of competitiveness requires a certain degree of market integration. After 
all, we can only approximate countries’ productive capabilities through their exports if they 
participate in international trade. In this paper we therefore compare two periods of deep market 
integration during two eras of globalization. 
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In order to use exports as a reliable indicator for countries’ underlying production capabilities we 
want to filter out accidental exports. A country might be exporting a certain good in small 
quantities due to a glut on its market which might lead to the good being sold below its cost. We 
would not want to infer from such an export that a country is competitive on the world market in 
producing this good. We therefore follow the literature that uses export data to proxy for 
productive capabilities (Hausmann & Hidalgo, 2011; Sutton & Trefler, 2016) and adopt a 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) as defined by Balassa (1965) of 0.5 to prevent our results 
from being driven by very small export lines while at the same time avoiding being too 
restrictive. That is, we calculate each commodity’s share in total exports of a country and the 
world, and only include those export lines for which the share in a country’s export is at least 
half of that in world trade. Due to missing data in some years for some countries in both periods, 
we take the arithmetic average of annual export flows of those years for which data is available, 
rather than the sum over all years. We then base all our measures on the average annual flows of 
each period.11 
 
The most straightforward proxy for productive capabilities based on non-bilateral export data is 
diversity, a simple count of the number of distinct commodities above an RCA threshold of 0.5 
(Hausmann et al., 2014, pp. 24–25; Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009).12 The idea is that the more 
different kinds of commodities a country is exporting the more productive capabilities it has. 
Export diversification has long been used as an indicator for levels of industrialization in the 
development literature (Felipe, Kumar, Abdon, & Bacate, 2012). Absolute levels of 
diversification have increased markedly across the two globalizations. In the last era of 
globalization, the United Kingdom was by far the most diversified country with 71 distinct 
export lines at the SITC 3 level for the years 1897-1906, whereas the mean diversification level 
was only 17 (Table 2). In contrast, the most diversified countries in the present era of 
globalization, France and Spain, both had 201 distinct export lines in the years 1998-2007 while 
the mean of all countries of 84 surpassed the UK’s diversification in the last era of globalization. 
This reflects that the novelty of the present era of globalization compared to the previous one lies 
in the quantitative extent to which manufacturing processes have been broken up and distributed 
across borders (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007, p. 511). 
 
Since we are here interested in countries’ productive capabilities in relation to all others in the 
cross section, we normalize all diversification levels by dividing through the maximum exports 
lines of the most diversified country in the respective period (Great Britain and France). This 
rescaled diversification measure allows us to examine the extent to which countries have 
changed their rank on the development ladder across the two globalizations.13  
 
The maps (Figure 1a and 1b) show countries’ diversification ranks during our two periods (1897-
1906 and 1998-2007). Blank areas are missing from our data: these are mainly landlocked 
countries. The maps suggest that East and South Asia mostly ranked in the upper third across 
both periods with China and Thailand as examples of catching up. Central Asia, the Middle East 
and Africa have largely fallen behind starting mostly from medium ranks, while Latin American 
 
11 This treatment also applies to all control variables. 
12 See appendix for a formal derivation of the diversification measurement.  
13 See appendix for a formal definition of normalized diversification.  
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countries have become more polarized. Europe and the United States have sustained top 
diversification ranks across both periods.  
 
High levels of diversification for Europe and North America contrast with the conventional 
wisdom that the late 19th century was a period of Great Specialization with the European 
countries and settler colonies specializing in manufacturing and the rest of the world specializing 
in agricultural goods and raw materials (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007, p. 411). Our data does 
confirm the previous observation that colonies and independent countries were mostly limited to 
exporting such low value-added goods. The manufacturing share in exports was very low for 
most countries (mean 0.09) and reached a maximum of 0.71 per cent for Great Britain (Table 2). 
However, instead of specializing, exporters of manufacturing goods were diversified and 
competitively exported also primary products. Some prominent examples in this regard are Great 
Britain, Germany, Belgium and France. The fact that the more diversified a country the higher its 
manufacturing share is shown by a strong correlation (0.74) between the two measures for the 
1897-1906 period which is considerably higher than the 0.44 we find for the contemporary 
period (Table 3). 
 
 
We calculate the Gini coefficient over countries’ export lines for the peak of the last and present 
eras of globalization (Figure 2). The two Ginis are surprisingly close with 0.40 for 1897-1906 
and 0.36 for 1998-2007. The relative inequality in diversification in the present era of 
globalization is of a similar magnitude as that in the period that has previously been considered 
one of Great Specialization. Lorenz curves plotted for both periods in Figure 2 confirm this. 
While the Gini has fallen slightly, the lack of Lorenz dominance (the two curves intersect) leaves 
the evaluation of the change in relative inequality across the distribution ambiguous. To the 
extent that catching up has taken place it is skewed to the upper half of the distribution. The rest 
of the paper explores the persistence of countries’ relative productive capabilities. For this, it is 
relevant that the overall distribution of our basic measure, diversification, is roughly stable 
across the two periods. 
Beyond the simple count of distinct commodities competitively exported by a country that 
characterizes the diversification measure, the quality of exports can be assessed to approximate 
the underlying productive capacities employing complexity measures. To go beyond 
diversification, we can consider the ubiquity of export products. Hausman and Hidalgo (2011) 
define ubiquity as the number of countries competitively exporting a certain product (RCA≥0.5 
at SITC-3), where the larger this number of countries, the more ubiquitous a good.14 The idea is 
that more ubiquitous commodities are those that require less capabilities and can therefore be 
competitively produced by a large number of countries. In order to approximate the underlying 
productive capabilities of a country, we therefore want to take both diversity and ubiquity into 
account. After all, diversity could be a misleading measure if one country exports many 
ubiquitous goods that require little productive capabilities where another country exports a small 
number of capability intensive non-ubiquitous goods.  
Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011) find a robust relationship between ubiquity and diversification: 
less diversified countries tend to export more ubiquitous goods, whereas the most diversified 
 
14 See appendix for a formal definition. 
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countries tend to export both ubiquitous and non-ubiquitous goods that are out of reach for the 
countries further down in the diversification hierarchy. This relationship appears as a triangular 
adjacency matrix between countries and products for recent years (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). 
This same triangular structure also appears in our data for the previous globalization (Figure 3a) 
and is confirmed for the present period (Figure 3b). Then and now less diversified countries are 
constrained to a small range of goods exported by many competitors.  
 
Economic complexity is a measure that combines ubiquity and diversity in an iterative process 
weighing countries’ diversity with the ubiquity of its products and the ubiquity of products in 
turn by the diversity of the exporting countries (see appendix for a formal definition using matrix 
notation) (Hidalgo & Hausmann, 2009). This measure gives a scalar index of how similar 
countries’ export baskets are to each other (Mealy, Farmer, & Teytelboym, 2019). The economic 
complexity ranking is an approximation of countries’ relative levels of productive capabilities at 
any point in time that considers not only the number of goods exported but also what and how 
many other countries can export these goods. As such complexity contains more information 
than diversity. Figures 4a-b map countries economic complexity rankings by decile for 1897-
1906 and 1998-2007. The overall picture is similar to that for the maps of the diversification 
ranking. Europe and the United States are on top of the complexity ranking in the historical 
period and continue to lead in 1998-2007 with the United States, however, moving down to the 
second highest decile. Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe (including Russia) have fallen 
behind also in terms of economic complexity, while Latin America has become more polarized 
staying overall in medium ranks. Asia has caught up more in terms of economic complexity than 
diversification, reaching medium to high ranks.  
 
For a set of exceptional cases, diversity performs better as an indicator for productive 
capabilities. This is the case for countries with low levels of diversification that export some non-
ubiquitous goods unique to a few countries due to a scarce natural endowment. Consider for 
example Guyana, which was reasonably undiversified, but exported diamonds, a specialization 
shared by only two other countries in the historical period. Combining ubiquity and 
diversification in a measure of economic complexity, ranks the productive capabilities of such a 
country more highly than when considering only diversification. This is a similar “statistical 
illusion” as that found for more recent data in relation to developing countries (S. Lall, 2000; 
Lectard & Rougier, 2018).15 A higher complexity rank in cases like this may be just a reflection 
of the uniqueness of a country’s soil, climate or raw materials and not of its skill level or degree 
of industrialization—though it may be a good omen for the terms of trade, since a country that 
monopolizes the entire supply of a particular good will have market power. For this reason, we 
use both diversification and complexity to approximate productive capabilities. 
 
An alternative proxy of productive capabilities is export sophistication (Lectard & Rougier, 
2018). Not only countries but also goods can be ranked according to their complexity using an 
analogous method to the one just described. Sophistication ranks countries by weighing the 
product complexity of a country’s export products by their share in the export basket.16 In 
 
15 There the issue is that when countries with low levels of industrialization contribute labor-intensive steps in the 
global value chain for highly complex products the export basket can make it appear as if the industrial structure was 
more advanced than it actually is.  
16 See appendix for a formal definition of Sophistication.  
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addition to using an RCA threshold, this measure is sensitive to the relative importance of goods 
in a country’s exports in ways that economic complexity is not. This can make a marked 
difference. For example, both China and the United States reach the top decile according to 
sophistication. But the two countries rank in the second highest decile for 1998-2007 in terms of 
economic complexity. For robustness we therefore consider both economic complexity and 
sophistication in our analysis. 
 
All three proxies for productive capabilities, diversity, economic complexity and sophistication 
are comparable across periods thanks to our translation of the historical data into the SITC 
system. Table 2 reports summary statistics for both periods. In Table 3 we analyze correlation 
patterns across our key variables and find that they are all positively and highly significantly 
correlated. This indicates that all three measures proxy a common underlying feature, productive 
capabilities.  
 
III. MAIN RESULTS 
 
In this section we present our empirical strategy and main results. We demonstrate that the 
values of all our proxies of productive capabilities for the previous era of globalization are highly 
statistically significant and quantitatively important in relation to their respective contemporary 
values. Our measures of productive capabilities in 1896-1907 are also a highly significant 
predictor of real GDP per capita in the current period. Unlike most persistence studies (Bisin & 
Moro, 2021), we can measure the same variables for both the historical reference period (1897-
1906) and the contemporary one (1998-2007). This is possible since all proxies for productive 
capabilities (diversification, economic complexity and export sophistication) rely solely on 
export data which we have available for both periods thanks to the construction of our new 
database (see section II). We can therefore use standard regression techniques to test the 
persistence in productive capabilities over time. We verify our results by varying the SITC digit 
levels, subperiods (Tables 5 & 6) and RCA cutoff points of 0.1 and 1 .17 We also employ 
principal component analysis after adding the manufacturing share as an additional measure. We 
rule out re-emergence for both the persistence in productive capabilities as well as the relation 
between historical productive capabilities and contemporary income levels by running our 
regression for intermediate periods.  
 
A Productive Capabilities across a Century 
 
Prior to running regressions, Figures 5a-c illustrate our main finding: all three measures of 
productive capabilities point to strong persistence across the two eras of globalization. Each 
figure plots one of the three key variables (normalized diversification, economic complexity, and 
sophistication) for the previous globalization (1897-1906) on the horizontal and the present 
globalization (1998-2007) on the vertical axis. For each variable we observe a strong and 
positive correlation: the higher a country was up on the ladder of productive capabilities a 
century ago, the higher up it tends to be in the present globalization. The strong positive 
 
17 Varying SITC digit levels and RCA is standard practice in the diversification and economic complexity literature. 
Results available from the authors upon request. 
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correlations are robust to varying levels of minimum RCAs and for different subperiods in the 
contemporary data.18 
 
The correlation between past and present diversification levels is strongest out of the three 
measures (0.73). Figure 5a also suggests more than third of the countries in our data, mostly 
former European colonies in Africa, are stuck across the two periods with less than 25% of the 
maximum diversification. Some countries have nevertheless managed to catch up and the mean 
of the normalized diversification has increased across the two periods from 0.24 to 0.42 (Table 
2). However, as the Lorenz curve in Figure 2 illustrates, most of this catching up in 
diversification has taken place near the top of the hierarchy, a phenomenon described for GDP 
by Pritchett (1997). In 1897-1906 the UK was far ahead of all other countries. Its closest 
neighbors, France and Germany only reached 70 and 72 percent of the British diversification 
level. In 1998-2007, eight countries – all European or North American – scored above 80 per 
cent of the maximum diversification level. 
 
For economic complexity (Figure 5b), the best linear fit has a slope of lower than 1 (0.70, Table 
5, Column 3) which suggests that despite the general persistence some degree of catching up has 
occurred in terms of economic complexity. Notably, Japan and South-Korea have overtaken the 
European countries and the United States that continue to dominate in terms of diversification, 
while China and Mexico, for example, have caught up to the ranks of countries that dominated 
the top a century ago. For economic complexity, too, most African countries have either been 
stuck at the bottom of the ranking or have fallen even further behind compared to the historical 
period (1897-1907). For Latin America the picture is mixed with Chile as the country that has 
fallen furthest behind compared to where it started at the turn of the 20th century and Brazil as a 
notable exponent of catching up to upper-middle ranks.  
 
Figure 5c illustrates the correlation (0.61) between countries’ sophistication in 1897-1906 and 
1998-2007, and points to a slightly greater potential for catch up compared to the very high 
persistence in economic complexity and diversification. This shows that to the extent that 
countries have managed to climb up the productive capabilities ladder, they have done so 
predominantly by increasing their exports in more sophisticated (or less ubiquitous) goods rather 
than relying primarily on exporting more different goods. Korea, the Philippines and China stand 
out as countries that have moved from upper middle to top ranks.  
 
In section II.C we show that the persistence in our three measures of productive capabilities is 
statistically significant.  
 
B Empirical Strategy 
 
We broadly follow the approach in the pure persistence study by Voigtländer and Voth (2012). 
To estimate the persistence in productive capabilities, we use the following econometric model:  
 
"!
"##$%&''( = $ + &"!
"$#(%"#') + '(!
"##$%&''( + )!    (1) 
 
18 We find strong correlations for minimum RCAs of 0.1 and 1.0 using the same periods and when combining 1897-
1906 with the five year periods 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2007 and 2008-2012 as well as 1962-1971 and 1979-




"##$%&''( denotes one of the three proxies for productive capabilities in the current 
globalization at the country level and "!
"$#(%"#') its counterpart for the previous globalization. 
(!
"##$%&''( is a vector of control variables. These have been chosen from standard controls in the 
export diversification literature to test whether our historical measure is significant when 
accounting for the variables commonly considered as drivers of export patterns.19 To account for 
the degree of economic liberalization we include trade openness as the trade/GDP ratio and FDI, 
measured as the ratio to GDP, for financial openness.20 In light of the great importance attributed 
to human capital for growth (Barro, 2001), we control for the mean years of schooling. 
Following the large literature on the resource curse which finds that raw material abundance 
undermines the prospects for economic diversification (Frankel, 2010), we control for resource 
rents measured as the share of total natural resource rents in GDP. We control for the quality of 
institutions as possible alternative explanation of productive capabilities using POLITY V data. 
See Table 4 for an overview of all data sources. 
 
C Persistence in Productive Capabilities 
 
Table 5a reports the ordinary least square (OLS) regression based on the specification in III.B. 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the bivariate regressions of our main variables diversification, 
economic complexity and sophistication in 1998-2007 on the respective variables in 1897-1906. 
The association between the historical variables and their contemporary counterparts are all 
positive and significant at the 1 per cent significance level. This significance carries over after 
adding standard control variables in the trade diversification and growth literature in columns 
(2), (4), and (6). Resource rent and population are also highly significant in relation to all three 
key variables; human capital is only significant in relation to diversification and complexity not 
sophistication while the reverse is the case for trade openness. FDI is significant at 5 per cent in 
relation to diversification, and polity is significant at 10 per cent, in relation to diversification 
and sophistication.  
 
Based on all three proxies of productive capabilities, persistence across the two waves of 
globalization is quantitatively vastly more important than the whole range of standard variables 
combined. The historical values of the three key variables can account by themselves for a major 
share of the variance in their contemporary counterparts: 48 per cent for diversification, 49 per 
cent for complexity and 39 per cent for sophistication. All other controls add 27, 23, and 34 
percentage points respectively to the R-squared statistic.  
 
The positive, quantitatively important and highly significant association between historical and 
contemporary diversification, complexity and sophistication subject to the control variables in 
Table 5, is robust when using SITC-2 and SITC-4 instead of SITC-3; when applying a low RCA 
 
19 For studies on trade diversification that each employs a subset of these controls see for example: Agosin, 2007; 
Agosin, Alvarez, & Bravo-Ortega, 2012; Cadot, Carrère, & Strauss-Kahn, 2013; Imbs & Wacziarg, 2003; Lectard & 
Rougier, 2018; Parteka & Tamberi, 2013. We have only added variables that measure levels rather than a rate of 
change since we are not interested in the changes within our contemporary reference period but the persistence 
across the two periods.  
20 The question whether economic liberalization aids or hinders diversification is a contested policy issue and studies 
reach inconsistent conclusions (Carrere, Cadot, & Strauss-Kahn, 2011; Chang & Andreoni, 2020; Dennis & 
Shepherd, 2011; Parteka & Tamberi, 2013; Rodrik, 2016).  
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of 0.1 and a high RCA of 1.0; as well as when substituting the contemporary reference period 
(1998-2007) with alternative subperiods (1962-1971, 1979-1988, see Table 5b).21  
 
D Principal Component Analysis and Re-Emergence 
 
To ensure the validity of our main regression results, we verify that our measures are 
approximating underlying productive capabilities and are not driven by the structure of the 
Standard International Trade Classification system. To this end we have varied the SITC digit 
levels as described. In addition, we add the manufacturing share in countries’ export baskets as a 
more traditional measure of industrialization levels to our regression and perform a principal 
component analysis (PCA). Compared with the other three measures the manufacturing share is 
less sensitive to the structure of our data. 
 
The contemporary manufacturing share is also positively and significantly correlated with its 
historical counterpart when controlling for covariates (Table 5a, column 8). 8 per cent of the 
variance are explained by the historical value of the manufacturing share. The small R-squared 
compared to our three main variables reflects that these other measures produce a full ranking of 
all countries while 30 countries did not export any manufacturing goods competitively (RCA≥ 
0.5) in the historical period, ranking them all equally low. It is still remarkable that after decades 
of deindustrialization in Europe and North America and despite the globalization of 
industrialization and production chains in the current period, the manufacturing share a century 
earlier has a significant bearing on current outcomes.  
 
We calculate the first principal component of the normalized scores of all four measures. We use 
the first principal component for 1998-2007 as dependent and the one for 1897-1906 as 
independent variable in columns (9) and (10) of Table 5a. The PCA confirms our previous result: 
productive capabilities are persistent and past ranks significantly impact those we observe today. 
In the bivariate regression, the historical principal component explains 49 per cent of the 
variation in the contemporary counterpart. Adding the control variables increases the R-squared 
by 27 percentage points. The first principal component is significant at the 1 per cent level (see 
Table 5a, columns (9) and (10).  
 
The current era of globalization constitutes a break from the more protectionist and state-led 
policy regimes of the post-war period. We therefore also test whether the persistence in 
productive capabilities is not in fact a re-emergence (Voth, 2021). To this end, in Tables 5b and 
7, we present the same regression as for 1998-2007 using our proxies for productive capabilities 
for 1962-1971 and 1979-1988 as dependent variables instead. We find that the significance 
across all five measures (diversification, complexity, sophistication, manufacturing share and 
first principal component) is consistently positive and highly significant at 1 per cent except for 
manufacturing in 1979-1988. The variance explained by our historical measures is even higher 
for 1962-1971 and 1979-1988 compared to 1998-2007. Across all five measures the variance 
accounted for by the historical correlates decreases slightly across the three periods. The 
coefficients for all our main explanatory variables are slightly lower for the 1998-2007 period 
 
21 Robustness results available from the authors on request. 
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compared with the previous periods. This confirms that productive capabilities are persistent 
rather than re-emergent.   
 
Our results so far show that the higher a country was up on the productive capabilities ladder at 
the turn of the 20th century, the higher its position in today’s era of globalization as well as in the 
intermediate post-war periods. Yet, this does not imply that there is no scope for path defiance. 
After all, about half of the variance remains unexplained by the historical position. This raises 
the question of the mechanism of persistence and the potential for defiance. In section IV. we 
examine the possibility of increasing returns to capabilities as possible explanation for 
persistence, explore possible omitted variables that could be an alternative reason for persistence 
(e.g. geography) and consider factors that enable path defiance.  
 
E Persistent Productive Capabilities and the Wealth of Nations 
 
An old insight and robust stylized fact in development economics is that the ways in which 
countries are integrated into global trade matters for their prosperity: higher levels of export 
diversification and complexity, are closely linked to higher levels of growth and GDP per 
capita.22 Our new dataset allows us to test this relation for the first time for the long run of a 
century. Figure 6 plots our first principal component of the measures of productive capabilities 
for 1897-1906 on the horizontal axis and GDP per capita measured in purchasing power parity 
(PPP). We find a strong Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.69 suggesting that countries’ 
position in the global division of labor a century ago is a strong predictor of today’s per capita 
income. Some salient outliers that performed worse than their productive capabilities under the 
previous globalization indicated are Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia and Mozambique. They are part 
of a group of sub-Saharan African countries that were at the bottom of the rankings in terms of 
the productive capability measures under colonial rule in 1897-1906 and have fallen behind even 
further in terms of their income today. The most salient upward outliers are the Bahamas, 
Bermuda and the Seychelles – all known to be tax havens and Grenada, a tax friendly 
jurisdiction (see e.g. Alstadsæter, Johannesen, & Zucman, 2018). India and China have 
performed worse in per capita terms than their export structures in 1897-1906 would suggest. 
 
In Table 8, we test whether this relation between productive capabilities then and per capita GDP 
now is statistically significant. Average GDP per capita in PPP for the years 1998-2007 is our 
dependent variable. The three proxies of productive capabilities (diversification, complexity and 
sophistication), the manufacturing share and the first principal component all measured for 1897-
1906 are our explanatory variables. We use the same controls as before (trade openness, resource 
rent, FDI, population log, human capital and polity). We find that all our measures of productive 
capabilities in the previous era of globalization are highly significant at the 1 per cent 
significance level in relation to per capita GDP in the present period. This finding is robust to 
varying SITC digit levels and RCA cutoffs as well as to measuring GDP at market exchange 
rates instead of PPP. This suggests that the more diversified, complex and sophisticated a 
country’s exports at the turn of the 20th century, the higher the wealth of the nation today.  
 
 
22 See for example Hausmann et al., 2007; Hausmann & Hidalgo, 2011; Hesse, 2009; Hirschman, 1958; Hidalgo, 
Winger, Barabási, & Hausmann, 2007; Lederman & Maloney, 2003; Prebisch, 1950; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Zhu 
& Li, 2017.  
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The productive capabilities in the previous era of globalization are not only highly significant in 
relation to today’s per capita income but are quantitatively very large. 56 per cent of the variance 
in today’s per capita GDP can be explained by countries’ economic complexity or the first 
principal component in 1897-1906. This is followed by 50 per cent for sophistication, 31 per cent 
for diversification and 27 per cent for the manufacturing share. After including the historical 
proxies for productive capabilities in our regression out of all control variables only human 
capital retains significance in relation to GDP per capita. Institutional quality and the economic 
openness measures – two variables of central importance in the recent growth literature and 
development policy making (Baldwin, 2004) – are consistently insignificant in relation to both 
GDP measures in our regressions.  
 
We test whether the relation between historical productive capabilities and contemporary GDP 
per capita is a case of persistence or re-emergence by using average GDP per capita for the 
periods 1962-1971 and 1979-1988 as dependent variables in Table 6b. We find that our historical 
proxies of productive capabilities are also highly significant and quantitatively important for the 
intermediate periods. The only exception is sophistication for the 1962-1971 period, which could 
be due to the uneven availability of GDP data at the time. The coefficients are of comparable 
magnitudes across our three periods. Overall, our results point to the relationship between 
productive capabilities and income being persistent rather than re-emergent.  
 
IV. PERSISTENCE MECHANISMS  
 
Our main results show a high degree of persistence in productive capabilities across the past 
century. In this section, we present a simple framework to analyze the persistence mechanism. 
We test whether persistence is a result of geography and institutions and show that the 
persistence in productive capabilities is largely driven by complementarities between past and 
future capabilities. The only factor that significantly impacts productive capabilities in both 
periods independent from persistence itself is a history of colonization. We explore shocks that 
undermine persistence and confirm the resource curse hypothesis. 
 
A A Framework for the Evolution of Productive Capabilities 
With our main results, we have shown that productive capabilities are broadly persistent across 
the past century. We use the model for technology adoption dynamics in Comin, Easterly, and 
Gong (2010) to help us think through the mechanism underpinning persistence in productive 
capabilities and apply it in our empirical analysis. The idea is that the mechanisms for 
persistence in technology also apply to the full range of productive capabilities beyond 
production techniques more narrowly.  
 
In their review of the economic history literature, Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2010, pp. 67–68) 
identify the following key drivers for persistence in technology: complementarities between 
existing technologies; recombination of old technologies into new ones; feedback and spillover 
of technology to science and vice versa as well as across different sectors; economies of scale 
and scope; and learning by doing. They measure technology directly as the adoption of certain 
production techniques. Our measures of productive capabilities instead measure outcomes in 
terms of export competitiveness that reflect underlying capacities. The basic intuition is that the 
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drivers that perpetuate technology advantages also apply to productive capabilities more broadly. 
As a general tendency, the more know-how, production experience, management skills, cutting-
edge infrastructure, science, world-leading firms etc. a country already has, the more it can 
acquire. In other words, there are positive returns to productive capabilities.23  
 
We can analyze the persistence mechanism in terms of this simple model: 
 
"!* − "!*%" = "!*%"
+
+,!* + )!*    (2) 
 
Where generations are indexed by t and countries by i. "!* denotes the level of productive 
capabilities up to time t. The term "!*%"
+  reflects the complementarity between past and future 
productive capabilities. The strength of this complementarity is approximated by the parameter 
'. ,!* is a parameter that measures factors other than this complementarity that also affect the 
enhancement of productive capabilities. This could for example include the institutional 
environment or natural endowments. )!* is the error term. See Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2010) 
for a more detailed discussion of the properties of this model.  
 
Depending on the value of ' this model indicates convergence, divergence or persistence. 
Assuming ,!* to be constant across time and countries for now, a ' bigger than one implies 
divergence. Countries with more productive capabilities would pull ahead of countries with less 
productive capabilities at an accelerating pace. This would quickly lead to an explosive form of 
bursting apart. If ' is equal to 1, productive capabilities are growing at a stationary rate and 
countries relative positions in the global economy are persistent. Finally, if ' is smaller than 1, 
there will be convergence in the long run. The productive capabilities of more advanced 
countries are growing slower than those of less advanced countries. But this process of 
convergence may be very slow. So, even after long periods initial levels of productive 
capabilities may still matter. Independent of the value of ', factors other than initial productive 
capabilities are of course relevant: Empirically, we do not expect ,!* to be invariable.  
 
B Persistence in Productive Capabilities versus Persistence in Correlates 
 
The model presented in (2) is consistent with two alternative persistence mechanisms: First, 
complementarity between past and future productive capabilities could drive persistence – the 
complementarity view (Comin, Easterly, and Gong, 2010, 90). Second, some factor other than 
the productive capabilities themselves could be persistent and drive the relative stability in the 
country rankings across long periods of time – the correlates view. For the correlates view,	' 
would be close to zero and the persistent difference in productive capabilities would instead be 
solely explained by a persistent variance across countries in ,!*. Note that the complementarity 
view is consistent with persistence in different values for ,!*. In other words, the 
complementarity view does not suggest a mono-causal story. The key for the complementarity 
view is that ' is not equal to zero. To rule this out, we first identify the correlates of our 
historical proxies of productive capabilities and then test whether the significance of the 
 
23 This interpretation of productive capabilities is broadly in line with Weitzman (1998) and other studies using 
combinatorial arguments related to innovation and growth.  
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historical levels of productive capabilities in relation to their contemporary counterparts still 
holds when controlling for these correlates.  
 
In light of the debate over whether institutions or geography drive growth in the long run (Rodrik 
et al., 2004; Sachs, 2003), variables that capture either of the two dimensions are important 
candidates to substantiate the first correlates view. The idea that climate, geography and ecology 
are key to explaining differences in economic performance has been recurring e.g. in the writings 
of Montesquieu (1899) or Marshall (1890). Diamond (1999) and Sachs (Sachs, 2001) have 
revived the hypothesis that geography drives growth and a number of recent persistence studies 
also highlight the importance of geographic characteristics (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013). 
Institutions have been an equally prominent explanation of differences in long run economic 
performance at least since the seminal contribution of (Acemoglu et al., 2021; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, & Robinson, 2001). The origins of today’s institutions have been traced to colonial 
times in this literature and institutional quality has been found to be persistent. It might therefore 
be the case that the persistence in productive capabilities we observe is only an expression in the 
persistence of institutions.   
 
A large and growing empirical literature confirms long-term effects of colonization (e.g. Dell, 
2010; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011) on growth performances. Reflecting that European overseas 
colonialism was important in shaping the global division of labor in the previous era of 
globalization, we use Hadenius and Berg-Schlosser’s (2007) colonial heritage dummy that 
records if a country was ever a European overseas colony and combine this with a dummy for 
European colonial powers. Missing observations have been added using data from the ICOW 
Colonial History Data Set (Hensel, 2018). For robustness, we also construct an additional 
dummy of colonial status which measures whether a country was a colony or a colonizer in the 
year 1900 from the ICOW as well.  
 
We have tested the significance of a range of geographic and institutional variables in relation to 
our productive capability proxies for 1897-1906 using OLS regressions. We have also included 
variables that measure other fundamentals such as the population size and used data from Pascali 
(2017) that measures shipping times in our historical period after the invention of the steamship 
to account for ease of market access. Population data was taken from the History Database of the 
Global Environment (HYDE) 3.2 dataset (Klein Goldewijk, Beusen, Doelman, & Stehfest, 
2017). The shipping time variable gives the hypothetical time taken by a steamship to travel 
between two ports (using, if necessary, the Suez Canal). Country-level data was constructed by 
averaging the shipping times for each potential destination port by their share in global exports, 
taken from our dataset. The resulting variable can be interpreted as a measure of a given 
country’s physical centrality in the network of global commodity trade. We also construct two 
variables to proxy for land and labor productivity in subsistence agriculture. We combine cell-
level FAO-GAEZ agricultural suitability indices for sixteen major food crops with HYDE 3.2’s 
estimates of cropland and rural population for all countries in our dataset. The labor productivity 
variable measures the maximum caloric output of all cropland in a given country in 1900 divided 




All variables that we have tested but found insignificant are reported in the notes to Table 7. 
Notably, the polity index for the year 1900 – a measure of institutional quality – turned out to not 
significantly affect the diversification, complexity or sophistication of countries’ exports. Polity 
measured in 1998-2007 is also largely insignificant in our main regressions (Table 5 a-b). This 
suggests that persistence in productive capabilities is not simply an expression of persistence in 
institutions. Ease of market access measured in terms of shipping times, the most important 
means of transportation in that period, is also not significant in relation to any of our proxies. All 
variables that we have found to be significant in relation to our measures are reported in Table 7. 
See Table 4 for the data sources of all variables included in the regression. To prevent 
collinearity issues, we have grouped geographic variables and variables that capture dimensions 
of countries’ economic structures and institutions separately.  
 
Soil suitability, ruggedness, latitude, temperature, humidity and coal are the geographic variables 
that are significant in relation to at least some of our historical proxies. Population, land and 
labor productivity as well as countries’ colonial status proved significant in the second group of 
variables. Being a colony was significantly negatively correlated with our measures of 
productive capabilities for both our measures of colonial status, whereas we find a significant 
positive relation for colonial powers. In sum, our findings suggest that productive capabilities in 
the previous globalization depended on a combination of geographic factors, population and 
labor productivity as well as a country’s position in the global political system.  
 
In Table 8 we test whether the correlates of our proxies of productive capabilities in the previous 
era of globalization also explain today’s productive capabilities and erase the effect of the 
historical proxies (' ≈ 0). We find that the only historical correlate of productive capabilities 
that is consistently highly significant across all proxies for productive capabilities is the dummy 
that measures whether a country was an overseas colony. European overseas colonies suffer from 
lower productive capabilities in 1998-2007 compared to all other countries even when 
accounting for their low ranks in 1897-1906. This difference is significant at the 1 or 5 per cent 
level and robust when using the alternative dummy that measures whether a country was a 
colony in the year 1900.  
 
All other correlates are only significant in relation to some but not other proxies. For 
diversification, labor productivity in the historical period still have some bearing today but this is 
not robust when using the alternative colonial status measure. A negative relation between 
temperature and economic complexity is significant only when we do not control for colonial 
status. 
 
The coefficients of our historical proxies of productive capabilities estimate '. They range 
between 0.39 and 0.75 and are 0.71 and 0.58 for the first principal component (Table 8, columns 
9 and 10). The fact that they are not equal to 1 suggests that there is some degree of convergence. 
But our main result, that after a century, historical productive capabilities still matter, suggests 
that this convergence must be very slow. Taken together, this supports the complementarity 
view. Productive capabilities are persistent not because of some third factor but because more 
productive capabilities in the past help countries to gain more productive capabilities in the 
future. This is, however, subject to an important qualification: countries that were European 
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overseas colonies at some point in history have fallen further behind compared to their already 
low levels of productive capabilities in the previous globalization.   
 
C Path-defiance: Which Countries Catch Up and Which Ones Fall Behind? 
 
To further explore the mechanism that drives persistence of productive capabilities in the long 
run, let’s consider cases of path-defiance. With this approach we follow Voigtländer and Voth 
(2012) who have pioneered the study of failed transmission. When have past levels of productive 
capabilities not determined countries’ future performance? One possible answer to this question 
is that there have been shocks to factors that affect productive capabilities which changed 
countries’ trajectories. That is ,!* might have been time variant for some countries but not others. 
As shown in the previous section, we find that most geographic variables as well as institutional 
quality beyond a legacy of colonization do not explain the persistence in productive capabilities. 
This does not rule out, however, that changes to institutions or the natural environment could 
prevent persistence.  
 
We analyze two types of shocks in relation to path-defiance: democratization and the discovery 
of oil. Democratization has long been considered key in countries’ development process. Based 
on recent contributions that report a positive relation between growth and democratization 
(Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, & Robinson, 2019; Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2007), we expect 
that countries that democratized improved their performance more than other countries. An 
upgrade in institutional quality thanks to democratization should bring about an enhancement of 
productive capabilities. Samuel Huntington (1991) has famously distinguished three waves of 
democratization. His focus is on the most recent wave from 1974-1990 which has about doubled 
the number of democracies in the world and culminated with the fall of Communism. The first 
wave started with the 19th century expansion of suffrage and coincides roughly with the previous 
era of globalization. The second wave was unleashed by the victory of the allied forces in World 
War II and reversed in 1962.  
 
In Table 9, we use the second and third waves of democratization to test whether an 
improvement in institutional quality has changed countries’ productive capabilities relative to 
where they were in the previous globalization. Our dummy for the third wave of democratization 
is based on data of Papaioannou and Siourounis (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2008).24 For the 
second wave, we have constructed a democratization dummy using the Polity V index. We 
define countries that increased their polity score above the threshold for democracy starting from 
a persistently lower level as democratized and have cross-checked our classification with 
Huntington’s own classification.  
 
We find that second wave countries significantly improved their position in the global productive 
capabilities ranking in the current globalization compared to where they started at the turn of the 
20th century (Table 9b). The only exception is the diversification measure. The interaction terms 
with our proxies for the previous era of globalization are not significant. Hence, this does take 
the form of a shock that undermined persistence: the countries of the second wave were lifted up 
in relation to all other countries but the ranking amongst them did not change significantly. 
 
24 See Papaioannou and Siourounis (2007) for a detailed data documentation. 
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However, the same result is less significant when we use 1962-1971 as reference decade which 
suggests that the full effect of democratization might unfold with a time lag. This is also 
consistent with our findings for the third wave. Countries that democratized in the most recent 
wave moved up in terms of economic complexity. But their sophistication and diversification 
ranks were not significantly altered (Table 9c). For diversification, the interaction term is 
significant and positive which suggests that the importance of the historical initial conditions is 
amplified in this dimension for the third wave countries. 
 
A large literature suggests that countries that have an abundance in terms of natural resources are 
cursed when it comes to industrial development and economic diversification (Auty, 1998; 
Frankel, 2010; Humphreys, Sachs, & Stiglitz, 2007). The finding in Table 5a-c, that resource 
rents significantly lower countries’ productive capabilities confirms this resource curse 
hypothesis. Discovery or new demand for some natural resources due to technological change 
are therefore possible factors that could change ,!* for some countries. In particular oil is a 
prominent candidate in the 20th century. In Table 9a, we test whether membership in the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) affects the persistence in productive 
capabilities. We find that based on three proxies with the exception of diversification, OPEC 
members have significantly moved down in the productive capabilities ranking compared to 
where they started in the previous globalization. In contrast, the relative positions to one another 
have been largely unaffected as indicated by the insignificant interaction term. This confirms the 
resource curse hypothesis from a long run perspective.  
 
The falling behind in terms of productive capabilities of the OPEC countries is also illustrated by 
the scatter plots in figures 5a-c: oil exporters are among the lowest ranking countries in terms of 
diversification, economic complexity and export sophistication and have moved down the ladder 
several steps compared to where they started in 1897-1906. 
 
Another possible channel that could alternate persistence is development policy. After all, 
industrialization and export diversification have been long-standing goals in economic 
development. As a preliminary step, we have tested whether (1) land reforms, (2) membership in 
the World Trade Organization, or (3) adjustment programs by the World Bank or International 
Monetary Fund have affected the persistence in productive capabilities. The rational for this 
choice of variables is that (1) is a proxy for big push development programs as common in the 
post-war period, whereas (2) and (3) capture whether countries have undergone economic 
liberalization. None of these three variables have been significant in the same exercise as the 
once reported in Table 9. This does not suggest that development policy is futile in general, but 
rather that more research is required to examine how development programs have succeeded in 
upgrading productive capabilities. It might also turn out that there is no one big solution that fits 
all: countries’ success in escaping the overall tendency of persistence might depend on strategies 




We document the persistence of productive capabilities across two periods of globalization at the 
turn of the 20th and 21st century. Our proxies of capabilities (diversification, complexity, and 
sophistication) are derived from export data with the same method across both periods. This is 
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possible thanks to the new global commodity export dataset we have constructed. We show that 
countries’ position on the development ladder a century ago significantly determines their 
present position. This effect is quantitatively important. To illustrate, 49 per cent of the variance 
in countries’ economic complexity today can be explained by their economic complexity in the 
previous globalization. Furthermore, historical productive capabilities have a statistically 
significant and large bearing on today’s wealth of nations. 56 per cent in the variance in GDP per 
capita in the period 1998-2007 can be explained by economic complexity in 1897-1906.  
 
We analyze the mechanism driving the persistence in productive capabilities and find that the 
most important factor is the complementarity between past and future productive capabilities. 
Countries that are already competitive in exporting a wide variety of goods, enjoy a complex 
economic structure and largely export sophisticated items, tend to perpetuate their productive 
capabilities. Conversely, countries starting from poor initial conditions, tend to be stuck with 
relatively low productive capabilities. This interpretation is consistent with predictions from the 
recombinant growth literature. Our results suggest that this is not simply driven by persistent 
geography or institutions. With one important exception: former European overseas colonies are 
performing significantly worse in terms of all proxies for productive capabilities. This confirms 
the great importance persistence studies have attributed to colonial origins of today’s economic 
performance (e.g. Dell, 2010; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011). 
 
We explore two cases of defying persistence. First, we confirm the resource curse hypothesis 
(Frankel, 2010) for the long run: OPEC members have significantly lost out in terms of 
productive capabilities compared to where they started a century ago. Second, we build on the 
literature on democratization and growth (Acemoglu et al., 2019) and find that democratization 
has to some extent helped improve countries’ productive capabilities. Weaker results for the 
quantitatively more important third wave compared to the second wave suggest that there might 
be a long time lag until the full effect has unfolded.  
 
The persistence in productive capabilities documented in this paper is a possible candidate for 
the mechanism that underpins the non-convergence in countries’ income levels (Johnson & 
Papageorgiou, 2020). What you exported matters and history has a long shadow on development. 
However, this should not lead to the conclusion that there is no scope for change. While still 
strong after a century, the effect of our historical proxies for productive capabilities does 
decrease over time even if the pace is slow. Yet, standard policy variables such as trade 
openness, FDI etc. have limited explanatory power once we account for the persistence in 
productive capabilities. Further research is needed that explores long-term trajectories of path-
defying countries’ to identify policy strategies that succeeded in undermining persistence and 
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Appendix: Measurement of Diversification, Ubiquity, Complexity and Sophistication 
The measurement of export diversification in this paper is based on Hausmann et al. (2014, 24-
5). Here we present a matrix version for easier replication. Let there be 0 varieties of 
commodities at a certain digit level (here SITC-3), and 1 countries in a certain period. Let 2 be 
the 	0 × 1 matrix in which each column records a country’s export values by commodity. Based 
on 2, We calculate the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of a country’s exports by 
commodity, and then set to zero those elements of 2 that fall below a given threshold (here 0.5). 
Let 4 be the accompany matrix of 2 (after applying the RCA cutoff), the elements of which take 
on the value 1 or 0 depending on whether the corresponding element of 2 is positive or zero. Let 
+- be an 1	 × 1 unit vector, and +. an 1	 × 0 unit vector, then diversity is a 1 × 1 vector 6-,' =
+.4, and ubiquity is a 0 × 1 vector 6.,' = 4+-. Our diversification measurement that measures 
the variety of goods that country 7 exports, normalized by the maximum variety is calculated as: 
879+:;7<7=>?7@1! ≡ 6-,'
! /CDE	(6-,') 
where CDE	(6-,') takes the maximum of the elements of the vector 6-,'.  
Let HIJK(9) be the transformation of the vector 9 ≡ (9", 9&, ⋯ , 90) into a diagonal matrix, i.e., 
HIJK(9) ≡ N
9" 0 ⋯ 0
0 9& … 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 0 90
R ; 
and use superscript T to denote transposition; then the iterative reweighting algorithms are given 
as: 6-,1 = 6.,1%"2 	4	HIJK%"U6-,'V, and 6.,1 = HIJK%"U6.,'V46-,1%"2 . By iteration, we have 
6-,1 = 6.,1%"
2 4HIJK%"U6-,'V = 6-,1%&	42HIJK%"U6.,'V		4	HIJK%"U6-,'V, and 6.,1 =
HIJK%"U6.,'V46-,1%"
2 = HIJK%"U6.,'V4	HIJK%"U6-,'V426.,1%&. At convergence, 6- ≡
lim
1→4
6-,1 is the eigenvector of the matrix 4--Z ≡ 42HIJK%"U6.,'V		4	HIJK%"U6-,'V, and 6. ≡
lim
1→4
6.,1 is the eigenvector of the matrix 4..Z ≡ HIJK%"U6.,'V4	HIJK%"U6-,'V42. Following 
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Hausmann et al. (2014, 24), we use the eigenvector that is associated with the second largest 





where _`Ja(⋅) and bH(⋅) take the average and standard deviation of all the elements in a 
vector, respectively. 











 is known as the product complexity index (PCI) of product f. It measures 
the weighted average PCI of a country’s export basket, using the product export shares of the 
basket as weights. 
 
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Data Coverage of Export Value, Countries and Share in World Trade, 1897–1906
Year Total covered trade Number of reporting countries Percentage of world exports
(current billion USD) (compared to Federico-Tena dataset)
1897 5.706 53 68.7
1898 6.867 53 81.4
1899 7.467 55 80.7
1900 7.991 63 81.2
1901 8.553 94 87.9
1902 8.759 98 86.5
1903 9.329 99 87.3
1904 9.913 100 89.0
1905 10.593 99 87.5
1906 11.485 73 86.2
1. Species and bullions are not included.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Proxies of Productive Capabilities, 1897–1906 and 1998–2007
Variable Unit Max Mean Min Sd
Diversification (1897:1906) Ratio 1.00 0.24 0.06 0.18
Diversification (1998:2007) Ratio 1.00 0.42 0.02 0.26
Complexity (1897:1906) Index 2.23 0.07  1.94 1.02
Complexity (1998:2007) Index 2.37 0.06  2.49 1.02
Sophistication (1897:1906) Index 0.68  0.91  2.12 0.77
Sophistication (1998:2007) Index 1.07  0.72  2.06 0.86
Manufacturing (1897:1906) Ratio 0.71 0.09 0.00 0.18
Manufacturing (1998:2007) Ratio 0.99 0.46 0.00 0.27
First principal component (1897:1906) Index 2.89 0.14  2.16 1.27
First principal component (1998:2007) Index 2.69  0.24  3.10 1.33
Trade openness Ratio 2.05 0.71 0.01 0.36
Resource rent Ratio 0.61 0.08 0.00 0.11
FDI Ratio 0.24 0.04 0.00 0.04
Population Million 1282.67 61.98 0.27 182.66
Human capital Index 3.60 2.37 1.14 0.67
Polity Index 10.00 4.89  9.00 5.63
1. Observations = 86. Measured for 1998:2007 where not indicated.
2. First principal component calculated based on normalized scores of diversification, complexity, sophisti-
cation, and manufacturing share.
1
Table 3: Correlations Across Proxies of Productive Capabilities, 1897:1906 and
1998:2007
Panel (a) 1897:1906
Diversification Complexity Sophistication Manufacturing
Diversification 1
Complexity 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 1
Sophistication 0.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.93⇤⇤⇤ 1
Manufacturing 0.74⇤⇤⇤ 0.63⇤⇤⇤ 0.64⇤⇤⇤ 1
Panel (b) 1998:2017
Diversification Complexity Sophistication Manufacturing
Diversification 1
Complexity 0.73⇤⇤⇤ 1
Sophistication 0.80⇤⇤⇤ 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 1
Manufacturing 0.44⇤⇤⇤ 0.72⇤⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤⇤ 1
1. Presented are Pearson’s product moment correlation coe cients.
2. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
Table 4: Variables and Data Sources
Variable Source Measure Code
FDI World Bank1 FDI (net inflows)/GDP BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS
Trade openness World Bank2 Trade/GDP NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
Resource rent World Bank Total natural resources rents/ GDP NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS
Population World Bank Population, total SP.POP.TOTL
Polity POLITY V data set3 Democracy score - autocracy score polity2
Human capital Penn World Table 9.14 See “Human capital in PWT 9.0” hc
Soil suitability Center for Int’l Development Percent of very suitable land soilsui1
Ruggedness Nunn and Puga (2012) See source for details
Latitude Acemoglu et al. (2002, Table 3) See source for details lat abst
Temperature Acemoglu et al. (2002, Table 3) See source for details temp4
Humidity Acemoglu et al. (2002, Table 3) See source for details humid4
Coal Acemoglu et al. (2002, Table 3) See source for details coal
Population (historical) HYDE 3.2 (Goldewijk et al., 2017) See source for details
Labor productivity
FAO-GAEZ, HYDE 3.2 See text for details
Land productivity
European overseas colony Bernhard et al. (2004, Figure 1) See source for details
European colonial power Bernhard et al. (2004, Figure 1) See source for details
OPEC www.opec.org Member or not
Democratization Constructed from polity Score reaches 6 and above first time
1. For Cuba, FDI (1993-2009) are from NACLA (https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-market/cuba/investment), and GDP
data are from World Bank (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD).
2. For Trinidad and Tobago, trade openess = merchandise trade/GDP + trade in services/GDP (World Bank, TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS,
BG.GSR.NFSV.GD.ZS).
3. Polity index for Bahamas, Iceland, and Belize are coded by the authors using the polity index score of similar countries according
to the Freedom House Index (https://freedomhouse.org/).
4. Mean years of schooling data from human development data (the United Nations) are used to compute the human capital index
according to “Human capital in PWT 9.0” for the following countries: Cuba, Georgia, Guinea, Guyana, Oman, Papua, New Guinea,
Bahamas, Grenada, Somalia, Seychelles, Tonga, Samoa.
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Table 5: Main Results—Persistence in Productive Capabilities 1897:1906 vs. 1998:2007
Dependent variable (1998:2007)
Panel (a) N.m N.m ECI ECI SOP SOP MAN MAN PC1 PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable 1.01⇤⇤⇤ 0.45⇤⇤⇤ 0.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.71⇤⇤⇤ 0.32⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤⇤
(1897:1906) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Trade openness 0.03 0.23 0.61⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.61⇤
(0.05) (0.30) (0.18) (0.08) (0.33)
Resource rent  0.81⇤⇤⇤  3.24⇤⇤⇤  3.79⇤⇤⇤  1.82⇤⇤⇤  5.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.20) (1.00) (0.75) (0.27) (1.20)
FDI 0.90⇤⇤  0.05 0.12  1.48⇤⇤⇤  0.05
(0.41) (1.52) (1.29) (0.49) (1.87)
Population (log) 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 0.22⇤⇤⇤ 0.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
Human capital 0.07⇤⇤ 0.52⇤⇤⇤ 0.14  0.02 0.47⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.18) (0.14) (0.05) (0.21)
Polity 0.01⇤ 0.01 0.02⇤  0.004 0.02
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.02)
Constant 0.18⇤⇤⇤  0.03 0.01  1.69⇤⇤⇤  0.07  1.61⇤⇤⇤ 0.42⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤  0.34⇤⇤⇤  2.34⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.49) (0.13) (0.42) (0.03) (0.15) (0.11) (0.56)
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86
R2 0.48 0.75 0.49 0.72 0.39 0.73 0.08 0.55 0.49 0.76
Dependent variable (1979:1988) Dependent variable (1962:1971)
Panel (b) N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1 N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable 0.47⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤ 0.43⇤⇤⇤ 0.21 0.45⇤⇤⇤ 0.66⇤⇤⇤ 0.60⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤⇤ 0.52⇤⇤⇤
(1897:1906) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
Trade openness 0.20⇤⇤ 0.57⇤ 0.71⇤⇤⇤ 0.13 0.90⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤⇤ 0.88⇤ 0.92⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤ 1.29⇤⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.34) (0.23) (0.20) (0.36) (0.11) (0.46) (0.23) (0.16) (0.49)
Resource rent  1.33⇤⇤⇤  4.14⇤⇤⇤  5.28⇤⇤⇤  1.90⇤⇤  6.79⇤⇤⇤  1.75⇤⇤⇤  4.92⇤⇤⇤  5.54⇤⇤⇤  2.48⇤⇤⇤  7.58⇤⇤⇤
(0.23) (1.09) (0.89) (0.75) (1.21) (0.39) (1.61) (1.08) (0.58) (1.73)
FDI 0.86 5.08  3.94  3.38 1.46  0.58  5.04  1.54  1.18  5.23
(2.30) (7.10) (5.26) (4.03) (7.58) (1.23) (5.98) (3.94) (1.85) (6.06)
Population (log) 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤⇤ 0.03 0.25⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤ 0.10 0.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.05⇤⇤ 0.18⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09)
Human capital 0.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.22 0.31⇤⇤  0.07 0.34⇤ 0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.20 0.39⇤⇤⇤  0.11 0.42
(0.03) (0.18) (0.14) (0.06) (0.19) (0.04) (0.29) (0.13) (0.08) (0.29)
Polity 0.003 0.02⇤ 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.003 0.01  0.002 0.01 0.01
(0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Constant  0.16⇤⇤  1.02⇤⇤  1.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.53⇤⇤⇤  1.59⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤  0.69  1.78⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤  1.41⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.48) (0.40) (0.20) (0.52) (0.11) (0.62) (0.33) (0.18) (0.62)
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 62 62 62 62 62
R2 0.85 0.78 0.83 0.34 0.85 0.82 0.76 0.82 0.38 0.80
1. N.m = diversification, ECI = complexity, SOP = sophistication, MAN = manufacturing, PC1 = first principal component.
2. Robust standard errors (HC3) are used. See Long and Ervin (2000).
3. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table 6: Productive Capabilities 1897:1906 vs. GDP per capita 1998:2007
Dependent variable: Real GDP (1998:2007)
Panel (a) N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable (1897:1906) 3.71⇤⇤⇤ 1.92⇤⇤ 0.88⇤⇤⇤ 0.38⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.36⇤⇤ 3.50⇤⇤⇤ 1.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.70⇤⇤⇤ 0.29⇤⇤⇤
(0.62) (0.82) (0.07) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.44) (0.43) (0.05) (0.10)
Trade openness 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03
(0.30) (0.37) (0.31) (0.28) (0.35)
Resource rent 0.36 0.80 0.64 0.21 0.78
(0.97) (0.91) (0.96) (0.95) (0.93)
FDI  2.32  0.48  0.05  0.56  0.43
(2.41) (2.58) (2.56) (2.39) (2.61)
Population (log)  0.13⇤  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Human capital 1.21⇤⇤⇤ 1.01⇤⇤⇤ 1.14⇤⇤⇤ 1.31⇤⇤⇤ 1.03⇤⇤⇤
(0.17) (0.23) (0.20) (0.14) (0.22)
Polity 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 7.98⇤⇤⇤ 5.83⇤⇤⇤ 8.81⇤⇤⇤ 6.47⇤⇤⇤ 9.88⇤⇤⇤ 6.48⇤⇤⇤ 8.56⇤⇤⇤ 5.76⇤⇤⇤ 8.78⇤⇤⇤ 6.41⇤⇤⇤
(0.20) (0.35) (0.09) (0.51) (0.12) (0.54) (0.13) (0.33) (0.09) (0.49)
Observations 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
R2 0.31 0.75 0.56 0.76 0.50 0.74 0.27 0.74 0.56 0.75
Dependent variable: Real GDP (1979:1988) Dependent variable: Real GDP (1962:1971)
Panel (b) N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1 N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable (1897:1906) 1.52⇤⇤ 0.33⇤⇤⇤ 0.28⇤ 0.78⇤⇤ 0.24⇤⇤⇤ 1.48⇤⇤ 0.28⇤⇤⇤ 0.17 0.83⇤⇤ 0.19⇤⇤
(0.70) (0.12) (0.15) (0.33) (0.09) (0.60) (0.11) (0.14) (0.34) (0.08)
Trade openness  0.05 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.10  0.61⇤  0.41  0.28  0.45  0.39
(0.35) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.38) (0.36)
Resource rent 1.31 1.37 1.16 1.08 1.30 1.40 1.06 1.02 1.54 1.01
(1.48) (1.50) (1.64) (1.59) (1.55) (1.46) (1.70) (1.91) (1.67) (1.78)
FDI 3.22 4.05 3.96 6.66 4.25  3.26 1.67  1.33  2.75 0.83
(8.97) (9.10) (8.44) (9.00) (8.76) (5.44) (8.43) (8.51) (6.29) (8.92)
Population (log)  0.11  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.20⇤⇤  0.12⇤⇤  0.09  0.13⇤  0.11⇤
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Human capital 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.63⇤⇤⇤ 0.77⇤⇤⇤ 0.95⇤⇤⇤ 0.67⇤⇤⇤ 0.98⇤⇤⇤ 0.79⇤⇤⇤ 1.05⇤⇤⇤ 1.15⇤⇤⇤ 0.87⇤⇤⇤
(0.13) (0.18) (0.23) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) (0.24) (0.24) (0.18) (0.24)
Polity 0.03⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 6.73⇤⇤⇤ 7.25⇤⇤⇤ 7.16⇤⇤⇤ 6.53⇤⇤⇤ 7.17⇤⇤⇤ 6.98⇤⇤⇤ 7.34⇤⇤⇤ 6.98⇤⇤⇤ 6.75⇤⇤⇤ 7.18⇤⇤⇤
(0.37) (0.48) (0.67) (0.36) (0.50) (0.37) (0.48) (0.55) (0.40) (0.47)
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 62 62 62 62 62
R2 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.75 0.75
1. N.m = diversification, ECI = complexity, SOP = sophistication, MAN = manufacturing, PC1 = first principal component.
2. Real GDP is log-transformed.
3. Robust standard errors (HC3) are used. See Long and Ervin (2000).
4. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table 7: Correlates of Productive Capabilities, 1897:1906
Dependent variable (1897:1906)
N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Soil suitability 4.28⇤ 16.40⇤⇤⇤ 9.03⇤ 0.67 18.88⇤⇤
(2.38) (6.18) (5.17) (2.22) (7.73)
Ruggedness  0.04⇤⇤⇤  0.003 0.01  0.02  0.002
(0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06)
Latitude 0.62⇤⇤⇤ 5.19⇤⇤⇤ 3.99⇤⇤⇤ 0.51⇤⇤⇤ 6.59⇤⇤⇤
(0.19) (0.55) (0.44) (0.18) (0.66)
Temperature 0.001 0.01⇤⇤ 0.01⇤⇤  0.0005 0.02⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01)
Humidity 0.001  0.01⇤⇤  0.01⇤ 0.002⇤  0.01⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.01)
Coal 0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.31⇤⇤⇤ 0.18⇤  0.004 0.36⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.11) (0.10) (0.03) (0.14)
Population (log) 0.04⇤⇤⇤ 0.12⇤⇤⇤ 0.07⇤ 0.02⇤⇤ 0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06)
Labor productivity 3.05⇤⇤ 25.32⇤⇤⇤ 17.47⇤⇤ 0.27 30.79⇤⇤⇤
(1.20) (6.24) (7.26) (1.02) (8.99)
Land productivity  8.14⇤  57.25⇤⇤  45.88⇤  7.49  74.14⇤⇤
(4.53) (27.17) (23.78) (5.51) (34.86)
European overseas colony  0.05⇤  0.88⇤⇤⇤  0.59⇤⇤⇤  0.06⇤  1.06⇤⇤⇤
(dummy) (0.03) (0.16) (0.15) (0.04) (0.21)
European colonial power 0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.76⇤⇤⇤ 0.61⇤⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤⇤ 1.02⇤⇤⇤
(dummy) (0.07) (0.22) (0.18) (0.09) (0.28)
Constant  0.001 0.25⇤⇤⇤  0.93⇤⇤⇤ 0.68⇤⇤⇤  1.67⇤⇤⇤  0.45⇤  0.17⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤  1.15⇤⇤ 0.90⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.04) (0.35) (0.26) (0.36) (0.25) (0.08) (0.07) (0.45) (0.35)
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
R2 0.50 0.71 0.79 0.62 0.75 0.52 0.40 0.52 0.80 0.61
1. N.m = diversification, ECI = complexity, SOP = sophistication, MAN = manufacturing, PC1 = first principal component.
2. Robust standard errors (HC3) are used. See Long and Ervin (2000).
3. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
4. On top of the control variables presented here, we have also tried including area, distance to coast and river, percentage of land in the
tropical area, land-lock or not, island or not, other measures of temperature and humidity, other measures of land suitability, constraint on
executive power, European descendants, reserves of gold, iron, silver, zinc and oil, European migrants, urbanization rate, population density,
real wage rate, and steamship travel time, which are all insignificant at the 10% level across models.
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Table 8: Correlates in 1897:1906 vs. Productive Capabilities in 1998:2007
Dependent variable (1998:2007)
N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable 0.75⇤⇤⇤ 0.39 0.61⇤⇤⇤ 0.55⇤⇤⇤ 0.61⇤⇤⇤ 0.54⇤⇤⇤ 0.57⇤⇤⇤ 0.40⇤⇤ 0.71⇤⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤⇤
(1897:1906) (0.19) (0.26) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.17) (0.16)
Soil suitability 3.00 5.97 8.67 0.82 8.63
(2.80) (7.16) (8.54) (3.51) (10.08)
Ruggedness  0.01  0.03 0.02 0.08⇤⇤⇤  0.01
(0.03) (0.15) (0.10) (0.03) (0.17)
Latitude 0.23  0.86  0.30  0.33  1.51
(0.25) (1.01) (1.08) (0.35) (1.46)
Temperature  0.0005  0.02⇤⇤  0.01  0.003  0.02
(0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
Humidity 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.0003 0.01
(0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01)
Coal 0.06 0.28 0.31⇤ 0.02 0.38
(0.05) (0.22) (0.19) (0.06) (0.28)
Population (log) 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.08
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08)
Labor productivity 4.85⇤⇤⇤  6.29  6.43  5.42⇤  10.07
(1.86) (8.17) (7.70) (3.04) (9.46)
Land productivity 7.41 51.10 85.86⇤⇤⇤ 35.87⇤⇤⇤ 100.97⇤⇤
(8.47) (34.70) (28.18) (10.77) (43.41)
European overseas colony  0.15⇤⇤⇤  0.54⇤⇤  0.42⇤⇤  0.15⇤⇤  0.67⇤⇤
(dummy) (0.06) (0.25) (0.21) (0.06) (0.32)
European colonial power 0.14  0.06 0.14  0.04 0.02
(dummy) (0.12) (0.21) (0.26) (0.11) (0.31)
Constant 0.07 0.26⇤⇤  0.42  0.13  0.86  0.78⇤⇤ 0.34⇤ 0.22⇤⇤  1.01  0.85⇤⇤
(0.20) (0.10) (0.80) (0.30) (0.74) (0.32) (0.20) (0.11) (1.02) (0.41)
Observations 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
R2 0.53 0.61 0.52 0.55 0.42 0.54 0.21 0.26 0.51 0.57
1. N.m = diversification, ECI = complexity, SOP = sophistication, MAN = manufacturing, PC1 = first principal component.
2. Robust standard errors (HC3) are used. See Long and Ervin (2000).
3. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table 9: Path-defiance—Resource Curse and Democratization
Dependent variable (1998:2007)
Panel (a) N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable 1.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.67⇤⇤⇤ 0.61⇤⇤⇤ 0.37⇤⇤⇤ 0.68⇤⇤⇤
(1897:1906) (0.15) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
OPEC  0.11  0.79⇤  1.70⇤⇤⇤  0.36⇤⇤⇤  1.39⇤⇤⇤
(0.12) (0.46) (0.37) (0.08) (0.48)
Interaction  0.63  0.13  0.57⇤⇤⇤  0.65  0.36
(0.69) (0.45) (0.20) (0.64) (0.38)
Constant 0.18⇤⇤⇤ 0.07  0.03 0.46⇤⇤⇤  0.20⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.07) (0.12) (0.03) (0.09)
Observations 99 99 99 99 99
R2 0.61 0.54 0.44 0.24 0.55
Dependent variable (1998:2007)
Panel (b) N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable 1.02⇤⇤⇤ 0.69⇤⇤⇤ 0.65⇤⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤⇤ 0.70⇤⇤⇤
(1897:1906) (0.15) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
Democratization 0.06 0.84⇤⇤⇤ 0.74⇤⇤ 0.16 0.91⇤⇤⇤
(second wave) (0.13) (0.16) (0.33) (0.14) (0.21)
Interaction  0.02 0.05 0.34 0.07 0.16
(0.33) (0.35) (0.25) (0.40) (0.32)
Constant 0.16⇤⇤⇤  0.07  0.14 0.40⇤⇤⇤  0.41⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.08) (0.13) (0.03) (0.10)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96
R2 0.51 0.55 0.41 0.11 0.53
Dependent variable (1998:2007)
Panel (c) N.m ECI SOP MAN PC1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable 1.05⇤⇤⇤ 0.73⇤⇤⇤ 0.75⇤⇤⇤ 0.45⇤⇤⇤ 0.77⇤⇤⇤
(1897:1906) (0.14) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
Democratization 0.06 0.38⇤⇤ 0.06 0.06 0.53⇤⇤
(third wave) (0.08) (0.17) (0.31) (0.07) (0.24)
Interaction 0.59⇤  0.13  0.26 0.31  0.19
(0.34) (0.17) (0.26) (1.10) (0.20)
Constant 0.12⇤⇤⇤  0.09  0.08 0.39⇤⇤⇤  0.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.08) (0.14) (0.04) (0.10)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96
R2 0.61 0.52 0.41 0.09 0.52
1. N.m = diversification, ECI = complexity, SOP = sophistication, MAN
= manufacturing, PC1 = first principal component.
2. Robust standard errors (HC3) are used. See Long and Ervin (2000).
3. ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Rank by decile
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(a) Export diversification, 1897:1906
Rank by decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(b) Export diversification, 1998:2007
Figure 1: World Map of Export Diversification in 1897:1906 and 1998:2007
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Figure 3: Matrices of Ubiquity and Diversification in 1897:1906 and 1998:2007
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Rank by decile
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(a) Economic complexity, 1897:1906
Rank by decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(b) Economic complexity, 1998:2007














































































































































































































































































































































Correlation coefficient = 0.58
(c) Export sophistication
Figure 5: Export Diversification, economic complexity, and export sophistication, 1897-1906 vs. 1998-2007
1. The gray dashed line is the 45 degree line, and the black dashed line is the OLS fitted line.







































































































Correlation coefficient = 0.69
First principal component
Figure 6: First principal Component 1897:1906 vs. GDP per capita 1998:2007
1. The gray dashed line is the 45 degree line, and the black dashed line is the OLS fitted line.
2. Correlation coe cient is Pearson’s product moment correlation coe cient.
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